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WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 In this appeal, we hold that under the Railway Labor 
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., grievances arising from the 
discharges of two employees should be arbitrated by the National 
Railroad Adjustment Board.  We conclude that despite the absence 
of a formally ratified collective bargaining agreement, a de 
facto agreement existed and that the Adjustment Board erred in 
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the grievances. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the district court's judgment 
sustaining the Adjustment Board's position.   
 Police Officers Richard M. McQuestion and Louis A. Hart 
were employed by New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc. until 
they were discharged on June 20, 1985 and August 2, 1985, 
respectively.  At the time of their discharges, they were members 
of the New Jersey Transit Policemen's Benevolent Association. 
Although the Benevolent Association was actively negotiating with 
N.J. Transit, no collective bargaining agreement had yet been 
ratified by the union membership at the time when the employees 
were discharged.  During the pendency of negotiations, however, 
employee conduct and grievance procedures followed work rules 
derived from an earlier, non-ratified draft of an agreement.   
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 After unsuccessfully pursuing in-house grievance 
procedures, the Benevolent Association petitioned the Adjustment 
Board to arbitrate the employee discharges.  The Adjustment Board 
dismissed both claims on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction, 
stating:  "In the absence of a ratified contractual agreement 
between the parties that covers Claimant's employment, the Board 
has no contractual basis upon which to rule."    
 The employees then filed petitions for review in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  The 
court dismissed the petitions on the ground that the employees 
lacked standing to contest the Adjustment Board's rulings on 
claims filed on their behalf by the union.  We reversed.  See 
McQuestion v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 892 F.2d 352 
(3d Cir. 1990).   
 On remand, the district court again denied the 
petitions for review.  The court concluded that the Adjustment 
Board's jurisdiction under 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) is limited 
to "resolve only `minor' disputes which have come to be defined 
as those arising out of the interpretation and application of the 
collective bargaining agreement."  Rejecting the employees' 
argument that the interim operating procedures implemented by 
N.J. Transit governed the dispute, the court decided that they 
were "not the same as procedures which are the ratified product 
of the collective bargaining process."  The employees then filed 
a second appeal with this Court. 
I. 
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 We exercise plenary review over the sole issue before 
us -- whether the employee discharges in this case are subject to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board.  See Miklavic 
v. USAir, Inc., 21 F.3d 551, 553 (3d Cir. 1994).   
 One of the primary purposes of the Railway Labor Act is 
to avoid disruptions to commerce caused by interruptions in the 
operations of rail and air carriers as the result of labor 
unrest.  The method of resolution of disputes between a carrier 
and its employees depends on whether the conflicts are classified 
as either "major" or "minor."  "Major" disputes are those 
concerning the formation or modification of collective bargaining 
agreements.  See id.  "Minor" disputes cover those more-or-less 
routine employee grievances that arise daily within the railway 
industry.  Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978) 
(per curiam). 
 There is no serious contention here that we are 
confronted with a "major" dispute, and the real issue is whether 
the discharges are "minor" for purposes of establishing the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board.  The pertinent 
statutory provision, codified at 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i), reads 
in pertinent part:   
"The disputes between an employee or group of 
employees and a carrier or carriers growing 
out of grievances or out of the 
interpretation or application of agreements 
concerning rates of pay, rules, or working 
conditions . . . may be referred by petition 
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of the parties or by either party to the 
appropriate division of the Adjustment Board 
. . . ."   
 In Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 
(1945), the Supreme Court described the statutory arrangement for 
the Adjustment Board's role as contemplating  
"the existence of a collective agreement 
already concluded or, at any rate, a 
situation in which no effort is made to bring 
about a formal change in terms or to create a 
new one.  The dispute relates either to the 
meaning or proper application of a particular 
provision with reference to a specific 
situation or to an omitted case.  In the 
latter event the claim is founded upon some 
incident of the employment relation, or 
asserted one, independent of those covered by 
the collective agreement, e.g., claims on 
account of personal injuries."1   
 Later in the opinion, the Court noted that the 
Adjustment Board had authority to determine what the employer and 
union had "agreed upon previously or, outside the scope of a 
collective agreement, what rights the carrier and its employees 
                                                           
1The Court further pointed out that "minor" disputes are 
generally those over rights accrued under a collective agreement 
and are not aimed at creating new ones for the future.  Burley, 
325 U.S. at 723.   
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may have acquired by virtue of other incidents of the employment 
relation."  Id. at 747-48 n.44.   
 In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' 
Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299 (1989), the parties had entered into a 
collective bargaining agreement, and the issue was whether the 
dispute should be classified as "major" or "minor."  After 
reiterating the Burley test, the Court observed that neither 
party relied on any express provision of the agreement. 
Commenting that the parties based their arguments instead on 
implied contractual terms, the Court concluded that "`practice, 
usage and custom' is of significance in interpreting their 
agreement."  Id. at 311.  Accordingly, although the collective 
bargaining agreement was completely silent on the issue at hand, 
the Court held that the dispute between the union and the 
railroad was a "minor" one and within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Adjustment Board.  Id. at 312.  
 The purpose of the Railway Labor Act and the role of 
the Adjustment Board was set out in Sheehan, 439 U.S. at 94. 
Describing the Adjustment Board as a tribunal for workers and 
management to secure the prompt, orderly, and final settlement of 
day-to-day grievances between employees and carriers regarding 
rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, the Court observed 
that "Congress considered it essential to keep these so-called 
`minor' disputes within the Adjustment Board and out of the 
courts."  Id.; see also Pennsylvania Fed'n of Bhd. of Maintenance 
of Way Employees v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 989 F.2d 112, 
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114 (3d Cir. 1993); Association of Flight Attendants v. USAir, 
Inc., 960 F.2d 345, 347 (3d Cir. 1992).     
 The burden imposed upon a party asserting that a 
dispute is "minor" is a "light" one.  Southeastern Pa. Transp. 
Auth. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Signalmen, 882 F.2d 778, 783 (3d 
Cir. 1989).  Whenever there is doubt as to whether a particular 
dispute is a "major" or a "minor" one, courts will construe the 
dispute to be "minor." See, e.g., Hirras v. National R.R. 
Passenger Corp., 10 F.3d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1994), petition for 
cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3693 (U.S. Apr. 7, 1994) (No. 93-1584); 
General Comm. of Adjustment, United Transp. Union, W. Md. Ry. v. 
CSX R.R., 893 F.2d 584, 591 (3d Cir. 1990); Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Eng'rs v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 768 F.2d 
914, 920 (7th Cir. 1985).   
 As a general matter, disagreements about whether a 
discharge from employment was proper and whether the claim 
brought by the employee is within the ambit of the relevant 
agreement are matters within the jurisdiction of the Adjustment 
Board.  See Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 
324 (1972); Capraro v. United Parcel Serv. Co., 993 F.2d 328, 333 
(3d Cir. 1993) (wrongful discharge is a minor dispute).  In 
United Steelworkers, Local 913 v. Union R.R., 648 F.2d 905, 911 
(3d Cir. 1981), we held that "[a]n employee complaining of a 
wrongful discharge after an investigative hearing has been 
conducted must submit the claim to an adjustment board pursuant 
to the Railway Labor Act."   
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 Most of the decisional law in this area discusses 
situations where a collective bargaining agreement already 
exists.  However, as Consolidated Rail points out, the dispute 
need not be governed by the specific terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement; implied terms, past practices, usage, and 
custom are sufficient bases for the resolution of a controversy 
by the Adjustment Board.  Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. at 311.   
 Some courts have mentioned in dicta the existence of a 
formal collective bargaining agreement as a prerequisite to the 
Adjustment Board's jurisdiction.  See e.g., Consolidated Rail, 
491 U.S. at 305; Miklavic, 21 F.3d at 554; Association of Flight 
Attendants, 960 F.2d at 349; United Transp. Union v. Conemaugh & 
Black Lick R.R., 894 F.2d 623, 628 (3d Cir. 1990); General Comm. 
of Adjustment, 893 F.2d at 589; Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 
882 F.2d at 783; Childs v. Pennsylvania Fed'n Bhd. of Maintenance 
Way Employees, 831 F.2d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 1987); International 
Ass'n of Machinists v. Northwest Airlines, 673 F.2d 700, 708 (3d 
Cir. 1982); Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 
756 (3d Cir. 1977).  The terms of an agreement are often 
irrelevant, however, to the actual resolution of the dispute. 
Courts must be wary of the curious metamorphosis that sometimes 
occurs in decisional law when a coincidence of fact in earlier 
opinions is treated as a jurisdictional element in later cases. 
See United States v. McElroy, 644 F.2d 274, 277 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(en banc), aff'd, 455 U.S. 642 (1982).  That being so, dicta 
about the necessity of a formal collective bargaining agreement 
must be read with caution.      
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 The statute speaks of disputes "growing out of 
grievances or out of the interpretation or application of 
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working 
conditions."  45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i).  In Burley, the Court 
commented somewhat enigmatically about the existence of a 
collective bargaining agreement "already concluded or, at any 
rate, a situation in which no effort is made to bring about a 
formal change in terms or to create a new one [presumably a new 
collective bargaining agreement]."  Burley, 325 U.S. at 723. What 
is considered an "agreement" for purposes of invoking the 
jurisdiction of an Adjustment Board has not received extensive 
analysis.   
 In Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor 
Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490, 503 (1989), the issue in dispute 
-- the sale of railroad assets causing the loss of jobs of two-
thirds of the railroad's employees -- was concededly not within 
the scope of the written collective bargaining agreement.  In its 
opinion, the Court wrote:  "Of course, not all working conditions 
to which parties may have agreed are to be found in written 
contracts.  It may be that `in the context of the relationship 
between the principals, taken as a whole, there is a basis for 
implying an understanding on the particular practice involved.'" 
Id. at 503-04 (quoting Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. United 
Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 160 (1969) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)).  It is not necessary that the relevant agreement 
between the parties be contained only in a formal written 
document that specifically addresses the issue in dispute.  See 
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Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pac. R.R., 
385 U.S. 157, 161 (1966) ("In order to interpret [an agreement 
under the Railway Labor Act] it is necessary to consider the 
scope of other related collective bargaining agreements, as well 
as the practice, usage and custom pertaining to all such 
agreements."); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Railway Labor 
Executives' Ass'n, 908 F.2d 144, 156 (7th Cir. 1990) (normative 
practices can create implied obligations in a collective 
bargaining agreement); Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 882 F.2d 
at 785 (parol evidence may be used to interpret collective 
agreements under the Railway Labor Act); CSX Transp. v. United 
Transp. Union, 879 F.2d 990, 1000 (2d Cir. 1989) (An agreement is 
established where a carrier's past practices have been accepted 
by union).   
 In Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 882 F.2d at 784 n.4, 
we concluded that "principles developed in construing collective 
bargaining agreements in the NLRA context provide relevant and 
useful guidance [for interpreting the Railway Labor Act]."  See 
Mack Trucks, Inc. v. International Union, 856 F.2d 579, 592 (3d 
Cir. 1988) ("Adoption of an enforceable labor contract does not 
depend on the reduction to writing of the parties' intention to 
be bound."); see also Merk v. Jewel Food Stores Div. of Jewel 
Cos., 945 F.2d 889, 895 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[A] collective 
bargaining agreement may be partly or wholly oral as well as 
partly or wholly in writing, and a written collective bargaining 
agreement may be orally modified."); NLRB v. Haberman Constr. 
Co., 641 F.2d 351, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) ("[A] union 
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and employer's adoption of a labor contract is not dependent on 
the reduction to writing of their intention to be bound. Instead, 
what is required is conduct manifesting an intention to abide by 
the terms of an agreement." (footnote and citations omitted)).2    
 In Luden's Inc. v. Local Union No. 6 of the Bakery 
Confectionery & Tobacco Workers Int'l Union, No. 92-1982, slip 
op. (3d Cir. June 17, 1994), employees remained on the job while 
the union and management continued to negotiate after a 
collective bargaining agreement had lapsed.  After a new contract 
had ostensibly been agreed upon, a dispute erupted over one 
provision.  We held that the arbitration process in the expired 
collective bargaining agreement should be utilized to resolve the 
dispute and described the relationship between the parties as 
creating an "implied in fact" contract.  We determined that the 
arbitration provision had remained in effect given the absence of 
any evidence that the parties intended otherwise and because they 
acted as if that portion of the expired agreement would continue 
to govern.  Id. at 35.      
 By way of contrast, in Davies v. American Airlines, 971 
F.2d 463, 468 (10th Cir. 1992), Regional Airline Pilots Ass'n v. 
Wings W. Airlines, 915 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990), and 
Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 773 F.2d 807, 814 (7th Cir. 1985), 
the Courts of Appeals took the position that a dispute that was 
                                                           
2Contrast the provision in the National Labor Relations Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 158(d), that requires the execution of a written 
contract if requested by either party.  Note also the requirement 
for a writing if a claim implicates an employer's duty to pay 
into union pension funds under 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B).  See 
Abbate v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 767 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1985).  
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not covered by the terms of a written collective bargaining 
agreement was not a "minor" one.  We are not persuaded by those 
cases, but are instead inclined to follow those courts which have 
adopted a flexible stance on the jurisdiction of the Adjustment 
Board.  For example, in Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 430 F.2d 994, 996 (9th Cir. 
1970), the Court found that a pay dispute not within the terms of 
the collective bargaining agreement, but "founded upon some 
incident of the employment relationship" was within the 
jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board.   
 Similarly, in Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. Brotherhood 
of R.R. Trainmen, 342 F.2d 298, 300 (5th Cir. 1965) (Maris, J., 
sitting by designation), the Court concluded that grievances over 
unsafe and hazardous working conditions were arbitrable disputes 
within the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board even where no 
express provision in the collective agreement governed that 
issue.  In the same vein, Hirras, 10 F.3d at 1149 stated: 
"[S]tate law claims that `grow out of the employment relationship 
can constitute "minor disputes" under the [Railway Labor Act], 
even when the claims do not arise directly from the collective 
bargaining agreement itself.'"  (quoting Morales v. Southern Pac. 
Transp. Co., 894 F.2d 743, 745 (5th Cir. 1990)). 
 The airline industry is also subject to the Railway 
Labor Act, but its contracts are more often subject to definite 
term limits than those of rail carriers.  Consequently, disputes 
occurring at a time when a collective bargaining agreement is not 
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in effect are more numerous in that industry and have come to the 
attention of appellate courts.   
 In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Aloha Airlines, 
776 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1985), the parties disputed the wages 
payable after a collective bargaining agreement had expired and 
during the period of negotiations for a new agreement.  The Court 
observed that the dispute was not subject to arbitration because 
"there was simply no existing collective bargaining agreement to 
interpret."  Id. at 816. 
 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected this 
approach in Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 
863 F.2d 891, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1988), concluding that the assertion 
that a dispute automatically becomes a "major" one when the 
agreement expires "appears to disregard the existence of disputes 
that are altogether outside the contractual relation of the 
parties and to slight the long line of precedents . . . that 
emphasize settled past practice in classifying disputes as major 
or minor."  The Court commented that the nature of a dispute is 
not determined solely from explicit terms of a written agreement, 
but it may also be derived from the past course of dealings 
between the parties.  Id. at 899.  Disputes that were once 
considered "minor" before the termination of a collective 
bargaining agreement do not change their characteristics 
thereafter.  The Court in Eastern Air Lines quoted with approval 
from Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, Lodge 16 v. 
Burlington N. R.R., 802 F.2d 1016, 1022 (8th Cir. 1986), 
acknowledging that "`[w]hen long-standing practice ripens into an 
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established and recognized custom between the parties, it ought 
to be protected against sudden and unilateral change as though it 
were part of the collective-bargaining agreement itself.'" 
Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d at 899.   
 In Miklavic, 21 F.3d at 554, we were confronted by the 
conflict between Aloha and Eastern Air Lines and adopted the 
rationale of Eastern Air Lines.  We pointed out that following 
Aloha "would mean that every dispute, no matter how firmly based 
in the existing but expired contract and no matter how 
insignificant, would become a major dispute subject to federal 
court jurisdiction."  Id. at 554-55.  We had previously cited 
Eastern Air Lines with approval for the proposition that to gain 
a comprehensive picture of the relationship between the parties, 
and thus of the full scope of the dispute, "`courts must consider 
the express terms of any agreements and well established 
practices that have developed through the [parties'] past course 
of dealings.'"  General Comm. of Adjustment, 893 F.2d at 592. 
 From these cases we may arrive at some general 
conclusions about the requirement of a collective bargaining 
agreement as it relates to the jurisdiction of the Adjustment 
Board: 
 1. The dispute need not be governed by the written 
terms of an agreement, but may be resolved by resorting to 
employment practice or custom; 
 2. An agreement need not be in writing for the 
purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board; and 
 3. After the expiration of a written, ratified labor 
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contract, the parties may by their practice or custom, continue 
to be governed by the terms of the prior contract. 
 III. 
 With these precepts in mind, we turn our attention to 
the grievances at hand.  A determination of the legal 
consequences of the parties' relationship here requires a 
somewhat detailed history of the events that occurred before the 
grievances arose.   
 Our recital of the facts is colored by the posture of 
the case before us.  In effect, the district court granted 
summary judgment for N.J. Transit in affirming the denial of 
jurisdiction by the Adjustment Board.  Most of the pertinent 
facts are not controverted, but we have considered the evidence 
in the record in the best light from the standpoint of the 
employees, McQuestion and Hart. 
 The saga began before January 1, 1983 when N.J. Transit 
took over certain commuter rail lines that had previously been 
operated by Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail).  The 
transfer was authorized by the Rail Passenger Service Act as 
amended by the Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981.  45 U.S.C.  
§§ 586, 588.  The statute required N.J. Transit and employee 
representatives to negotiate an implementing agreement that would 
govern the transfer of former Conrail employees to N.J. Transit 
and the retention of their seniority rights.   
 The statute also required N.J. Transit and employee 
representatives to enter into new collective bargaining 
agreements by September 1, 1982.  Id. § 590(a).  If the parties 
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were unable to reach an agreement under § 590(b)-(g), an 
emergency board requested by a party and created by the President 
of the United States could make a non-binding selection of one of 
the final offers, with employees retaining the right to strike. 
This procedure was the "exclusive means" for resolving disputes 
relating to the formation of an initial collective bargaining 
agreement.  Id. § 590(h).   
 Pursuant to the statute, N.J. Transit negotiated with 
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, at that time the 
bargaining representative of police officers transferring from 
Conrail.  Although the union representatives and N.J. Transit 
reached an agreement, the union membership failed to ratify it. 
 Following the procedures of 45 U.S.C. § 590, a 
Presidential Commission conducted a hearing and, in late 1982, 
issued its non-binding recommendation that the union adopt the 
contract its representatives had previously negotiated with N.J. 
Transit.  The union rejected the recommendation and was then at 
liberty to strike if it so chose.  The members, however, 
continued to work after January 1, 1983 without ratifying the 
proposed agreement even though the previous contract between 
Conrail and the union had expired on December 31, 1982.   
 In August of 1983, the Benevolent Association replaced 
the Teamsters as the bargaining representative for the police 
officers employed by N.J. Transit.  In the fall of 1983, the 
17 
union sent an untimely request to the National Mediation Board in 
an attempt to bring an end to the impasse.3 
 According to the union, when negotiations broke off, 
N.J. Transit -- using self-help -- implemented the unratified 
agreement as the operating guide for regulating the employment of 
the police officers.  Correspondence from N.J. Transit supports 
this assertion.4   
 Article 16 of the unratified January 1, 1983 agreement 
provided that police officers who had been in service for more 
than one year would not be suspended or dismissed "without just 
cause and without a fair and impartial trial."  Provisions for 
in-house trials and appeals were included as well. 
 This was the state of the relationship between N.J. 
Transit and its police officers in 1985.  On June 20, 1985, 
McQuestion was dismissed because of an incident in which, while 
on his way to work, he fired his pistol and wounded a motorist. 
Hart was dismissed on August 2, 1985 because of evidence that he 
had been arrested and charged with possession of cocaine.  Both 
                                                           
3The facts in the two foregoing paragraphs were set out in an 
affidavit filed by Patrick J. O'Brien, past President of the 
Benevolent Association. 
4In other litigation, in a similar factual setting, N.J. Transit 
argued that there had been contract ratification through 
performance, rather than that N.J. Transit had lawfully and 
unilaterally implemented the unratified contract.  See Dunn v. 
New Jersey Transit Corp., 681 F. Supp. 246 (D.N.J. 1987). 
Specifically, N.J. Transit argued that both it and the Benevolent 
Association had "followed procedures for resolution of grievances 
and appeals of disciplinary procedures which were contained in 
the unratified agreement, including the clause which provides 
that no employee dismissal shall occur `without just cause and 
without a fair and impartial hearing.'"  Id. at 249 (internal 
quotation omitted). 
18 
McQuestion and Hart were given in-house trials and took appeals 
to management officials in N.J. Transit as mandated by Article 16 
of the agreement.  It was only after failing to prevail in these 
efforts that the union filed petitions with the Adjustment Board. 
 In its submissions to the Adjustment Board, the union 
stated that the "unratified collective bargaining agreement . . . 
[was] independently under dispute before another authority,"5 but 
explained that the union was "forced to submit [the] submission 
to [the Adjustment] Board pursuant to said agreement." However, 
the legal arguments that followed were based upon language in 
"the applicable agreement," and the practice of the union and 
N.J. Transit in discharge cases indicated acquiescence with "the 
agreement." 
 The disputes between the two officers and their 
employer are classic examples of "minor" disputes that, had the 
agreement of January 1, 1983 been ratified, unquestionably would 
have been adjudicated by the Adjustment Board.  Indeed, these are 
precisely the kinds of disputes that the Supreme Court made clear 
were to be kept out of the federal courts and to be resolved in 
arbitration.   
                                                           
5On May 3, 1985, the union filed a petition with the New Jersey 
Public Employment Relations Commission, asserting that the state 
board had authority to resolve the impasse between N.J. Transit 
and the union over the formation of a formal collective 
bargaining agreement.  In 1986, the agency held that the state 
statute was preempted by the Rail Passenger Service Act and, 
alternatively, by the Railway Labor Act.  New Jersey Transit 
Corp., 12 NJPER ¶ 17280 (1986).  The union explained that it did 
not wish to be prejudiced in that state case by asserting before 
the Adjustment Board that it had agreed with the implementation 
of the 1983 unratified contract. 
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 Based on the less than complete record here, it is 
apparent that although the January 1, 1983 agreement was not 
ratified by the union, N.J. Transit and the union put its 
grievance provisions into effect.  These provisions formed the 
basis for the employment relationship between the union and N.J. 
Transit in the more than two-year interim before the McQuestion 
and Hart claims arose.   
 Neither the union nor N.J. Transit have ever questioned 
that an agreement existed to the effect that an officer could not 
be dismissed except for "just cause" and only after "a fair and 
impartial trial" -- the essential issues in the grievances 
presently before us.  In addition, both the union and N.J. 
Transit scrupulously followed the procedures set out in the 
January 1, 1983 agreement in processing the two claims.   
 Nothing in the record indicates that the "just cause" 
and grievance procedures in Article 16 differed from those in the 
contract that had expired on December 31, 1982.  In fact, in his 
affidavit, former union President O'Brien averred:  "The 
discipline/appeals provisions essentially mirrored those in the 
[predecessor] Conrail-Teamsters' contract.  They are pretty much 
industry standard." 
 In the absence of an agreement, N.J. Transit would have 
had the power to discharge the officers without cause.  See 
Conrad v. Delta Air Lines, 494 F.2d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 1974). 
However, the employer's compliance with the grievance procedures 
in Article 16 is strong evidence that N.J. Transit recognized its 
obligation to dismiss employees only for "just cause."    
20 
 N.J. Transit's joinder with the union in agreeing in 
its original submission that the Adjustment Board had 
jurisdiction is also significant.  Although the union and N.J. 
Transit could not confer jurisdiction on the Adjustment Board by 
consent,6 their mutual view that it existed is further evidence 
that an enforceable employment relationship was in effect -- at 
least as to discharges for cause only.   
 In short, in the scenario we have discussed, there was 
a de facto ("implied in fact") agreement on certain aspects of 
the employment relationship between the union and N.J. Transit. 
The fact that these particular matters were not incorporated into 
a formal, ratified contract that included many other terms not 
relevant to the dispute at hand does not deprive the Adjustment 
Board of jurisdiction.  As noted earlier, the prerequisite 
"agreement" is not limited to specific terms of a formal 
collective bargaining agreement, but may instead include evidence 
of past practices and custom such as those which seemingly exist 
here. 
 Moreover, if it develops that the discipline and "just 
cause" provisions in the contract that expired on December 31, 
1982 are essentially the same as those in the agreement the union 
and N.J. Transit implemented in the grievance procedures 
involving McQuestion and Hart, this case would fall within the 
holding of Eastern Air Lines that we approved in Miklavic.  Thus, 
                                                           
6The union argues that, in an earlier proceeding, the Adjustment 
Board found that it did have jurisdiction in a similar case.  
Dunn v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., Award No. 4365 
(N.R.A.B., Fourth Div. Oct. 24, 1985). 
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if the performance of the union and N.J. Transit establishes that 
the "just cause" and grievance provisions of the expired Conrail 
agreement remained in effect during the pendency of negotiations 
for a new collective bargaining agreement, they would constitute 
the terms of the continuing employment relationship and would be 
binding on the parties to this dispute.   
 It follows that the Adjustment Board took an unduly 
narrow view of its jurisdiction.  The Railway Labor Act does not 
require a ratified collective bargaining agreement, but speaks 
only in terms of an "agreement."  Caselaw also makes it clear 
that provisions other than those specified in a written document 
may be relevant and dispositive in the resolution of a dispute 
before the Adjustment Board.  
 In our view, the record establishes an agreement 
between the union and N.J. Transit on the conditions under which 
employment could be terminated and the grievance procedures to be 
followed by a discharged employee.  In such circumstances, the 
Adjustment Board would have jurisdiction to arbitrate the 
disputes.  However, because the parties did not fully focus on 
this aspect of the Adjustment Board's jurisdiction, they may 
require a hearing and an opportunity to present further evidence 
to clarify the record.  
 Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the 
district court and will remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
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McQuestion v. New Jersey Transit, No. 93-5515  
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting.      
 
 The majority and I differ little in our reasoning and 
conclusion.  But the differences, although small, are of 
considerable importance.  I can assume without deciding that an 
agreement existed, but only between the two appellants and their 
employer, N.J. Transit.  I cannot agree, however, that the facts 
of this case support the conclusion reached by the majority that 
a collective bargaining agreement had been reached between N.J. 
Transit and the appellants' union.  I also do not agree that we 
can so lightly reject the Adjustment Board's definition of an 
"agreement."  I would hold that the Adjustment Board properly 
concluded that without a ratified collective bargaining 
agreement, it had nothing to interpret and, therefore, no 
jurisdiction.  I would conclude that if an agreement exists here, 
it is not a "collective" agreement, nor an agreement between N.J. 
Transit and the entire union, but merely an "individual" 
agreement, which will not independently support federal 
jurisdiction.  Hence, I too would reverse the order of the 
district court, but would remand the cause for the district court 
to determine if there exists an independent basis for 
jurisdiction, and if not to dismiss.    
 The Adjustment Board's jurisdictional authority comes 
from 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i), in which it is granted the power 
to hear "disputes growing out of grievances or out of the 
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interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of 
pay, rules or working conditions."  In Elgin, J. & E.R. Co. v. 
Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 65 S. Ct. 1282 (1945), the Court said that 
such disputes, termed "minor," are subject to arbitration and 
"contemplate the existence of a collective bargaining agreement 
already concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which no effort 
is made to bring about a formal change in terms or to create a 
new one."  Id. at 723, 65 S. Ct. at 1290. 
 The essence of the Railway Labor Act is that it 
authorizes collective bargaining units to select bargaining 
agents and permits them to negotiate collective agreements with a 
carrier/employer.  Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 
94, 99 S. Ct. 399, 402 (1978) ("[T]he terms, purposes and 
legislative history of the Railway Labor Act ... endeavor[] to 
promote stability and labor management relations in this 
important national industry by providing effective and efficient 
remedies for the resolution of railroad/employee disputes arising 
out of the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.") 
(emphasis added, internal citations omitted); Virginia Ry Co. v. 
System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 592, 515, 57 S. Ct. 592, 600 
(1937) (The declared purposes of the Act give to employees "the 
right to organize and bargain collectively through a 
representative of their own choosing ....") (emphasis added). The 
Act uses the term "agreement," but given the purposes of the Act, 
it is fundamental that it means a "collective bargaining 
agreement," and is not meant to cover the garden variety, private 
agreements any employer can reach with its individual employees. 
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See Griesmann v. Chemical Lehman Tank Lines, Inc., 776 F.2d 66, 
71 (3d Cir. 1985) ("A collective bargaining agreement is the 
paradigmatic labor contract, covering a wide array of 
contingencies that may arise in the employment relationship, and 
distinguished by provisions for the arbitration of disputes 
concerning the agreement's meaning and application.") (internal 
citations omitted). 
 In Davis v. Ohio Barge Line, Inc., 697 F.2d 549 (3d 
Cir. 1983), an employee contended that a settlement agreement he 
had reached with his employer should be enforceable under section 
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.  We rejected that 
argument and concluded that "[a] private agreement between an 
employer and employee independent of a collective bargaining 
agreement generally does not fall within [the Labor Management 
Relations Act] even though the complaint alleges some nexus with 
the union."  Id. at 553.  We held that a federal court has 
jurisdiction over a collective bargaining agreement under the 
Labor Management Relations Act, but has "no independent basis for 
jurisdiction" over the settlement agreement which the employer 
and employee in Davis had reached. 
 Here too, there is no collective bargaining agreement. 
Merely because these two employees and N.J. Transit had at some 
point acted as though they agreed upon some portions of the 
rejected draft agreement, an enforceable collective bargaining 
agreement was not thereby created between N.J. Transit and the 
entire union.  At most, such an agreement would not be collective 
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but individual and would be enforceable, if at all, under state 
law and in state courts, not under the Railway Labor Act.   
 N.J. Transit did impose upon its employees many of the 
provisions which had earlier been proposed in the written draft. 
But inasmuch as that draft had not been ratified, and indeed 
because N.J. Transit had no collective agreement with its 
employees, it was free to impose upon its employees any 
conditions it wished within the bounds of the law.  N.J. Transit 
did behave in a civilized fashion towards these two discharged 
employees.  It gave them all the process to which they would have 
been entitled under the unratified agreement.  Nonetheless, to 
infer a federally enforceable de facto agreement between the 
union and N.J. Transit, simply because these parties behaved as 
they did, creates the possibility of much mischief and may well 
discourage employers from giving employees any perquisites or 
processes to which they are not entitled by law while contracts 
are pending.   
 The majority's conclusion that such a de facto 
agreement comes within the Act is unsupported by any authority. 
The majority modestly admits that "[m]ost decisional law in this 
area discusses situations where a collective bargaining agreement 
already exists."  (Maj. typescript at 8.)  It should be noted 
that in each Railway Labor Act case cited in the majority 
opinion, the parties either had a collective bargaining agreement 
which controlled and defined their rights, or were operating 
under an expired collective bargaining agreement during the 
"status quo" provision of the Act.   
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 Under the National Labor Relations Act, a collective 
bargaining agreement must be in writing if requested by either 
party.  29 U.S.C. § 158(d).  Although the record contains no 
specific request for a writing, the preliminary draft was reduced 
to writing; the written draft was submitted to the membership for 
ratification; and in this form, it was rejected by the 
membership.  There is simply nothing in this record to indicate 
that an oral agreement was acceptable.  Rather, the only 
supportable inference from this record is that both N.J. Transit 
and the union expected their collective bargaining contract to be 
in writing.  Consequently, I cannot infer that this alleged 
agreement, which was neither in writing, signed by the 
appellants, nor ratified by their union, can confer jurisdiction 
on the Adjustment Board.   
 In sum, I agree that if there were a valid ratified 
written collective bargaining agreement, this would be a "minor" 
and hence an arbitrable dispute.  I also agree that if the 
appellants' union and N.J. Transit were parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement, the issues in dispute would not need to be 
covered by an express provision of the written contract.  I do 
not, however, agree that an individual agreement between the 
parties --  whether a "de facto agreement," an agreement by 
implication, or an agreement created in any fashion other than as 
contemplated by the Act -- either creates a collective bargaining 
agreement between N.J. Transit and the union, or is the type of 
"agreement" that will confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts 
or the Adjustment Board.  Therefore, I conclude that unless 
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another, independent basis for federal jurisdiction exists, this 
case must be dismissed. 
